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T  NEXT FORTY PRESIDENTS
ORI ARONSON*
A thought experiment in feminist constitutionalism, this Article
explores a radical argument: allow only women to be elected as the
next forty U.S. presidents. While on its face blatantly discriminatory,
the forty female presidents rule turns out to be a robustly justifiable
idea, along multiple axes of political fairness, and not to women
alone—rather to the electorate as a whole. Due to several of its unique
characteristics, the presidency turns out to be particularly fitting to
innovation that would correct past injustices of political exclusion.
Corrective justice, affirmative action, feminist critique, voter auton-
omy, and the democratic costs of identity politics all provide support
to the strategy suggested in the Article, arguably outweighing re-
joinders and critiques, both fairness-based and consequentialist.
While adoption of the forty female presidents rule is not expected
to happen in the foreseeable future, its serious consideration reveals
a set of novel arguments in the fields of political fairness, gender
equality, and democratic representation, and hints at the institu-
tional contours of a temporal theory of corrective justice. Through
the exploration of the suggested corrective strategy, our moral and
institutional imaginations are, hopefully, broadened.
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INTRODUCTION
The defeat of Hillary Rodham Clinton in the 2016 presidential
election ended a historic run, being the first time a major party had
slated a woman as its candidate for President of the United States.
While other, nonmajor, parties have done so before,1 and while each
of the two major parties has already once selected a female vice-
presidential nominee,2 2016 was seen by many as the closest a woman
has ever realistically gotten to becoming president. A woman presi-
dent would have been a glass-shattering moment in American politi-
cal history, bending the arc of the moral universe a little closer to
justice. As such, the fact of its political feasibility should be a cause for
celebration to all Americans, regardless of gender or party affilia-
tion. Clinton did not win though, the glass ceiling remains intact, and
the future of feminist political mobilization is again up for grabs.3
With Donald J. Trump in the White House, we are left wonder-
ing what exactly it would have meant, in terms of gender relations
and identities, to have a woman as the forty-fifth president, and, ipso
facto, what it means for the first ever real woman candidate to have
lost the election. It is arguable whether Clinton’s loss should be viewed
as a defeat to all American women, or to the totality of feminist
1. Prior to Mrs. Clinton, over 20 other women have been nominated by mostly minor
and fringe parties as presidential candidates. This dates back to 1872 (Victoria Woodhull,
of the Equal Rights Party), although the lion’s share of these candidacies have emerged
only since the second half of the twentieth century. Jo Freeman, The Women Who Ran
For President, JO FREEMAN, http://www.jofreeman.com/politics/womprez03.htm [http://
perma.cc/6VHM-WRHM].
2. Geraldine Ferraro was the Democratic vice-presidential candidate in 1984; Sarah
Palin was the Republican vice-presidential candidate in 2008. Women Presidential and
Vice Presidential Candidates: A Selected List, CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POLITICS, http://
www.cawp.rutgers.edu/levels_of_off ice/women-presidential-and-vice-presidential-candi
dates-selected-list [http://perma.cc/Z3PQ-B7YB].
3. See, e.g., Deborah Cohan, Writing Grabs Back: Creativity, Resistance and Activism
in the Trump Era, 3 INTERDISC. PERSP. ON EQUALITY & DIVERSITY 1, 1 (2017) (suggesting
artistic and scholarly writing as a mechanism for reacting to the new political condition);
Joanne Faulkner, “White Women Elected Trump”: Feminism in ‘Dark Times,’ Its Present
and Future, 1 CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY 650, 650 (2017) (addressing the political
significance to feminism of the women’s marches movement that followed the election
of President Trump); Melissa Phruksachart, Who will save us from the Pantsuit Nation?
Reading liberal media in the age of Trump, 17 FEMINIST MEDIA STUD. 513, 513 (2017)
(citing “a crisis of leadership among contemporary women’s movements” that calls for
a redefinition of their purposes and strategies).
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causes. Had she won, it is debatable whether such a victory would
have been considered a victory to all American women, regardless
of race, creed, age, ideology, or party affiliation. The first woman to
be elected president—if this ever happens—will not be “any woman,”
just as the first African American president was not representative
of all African Americans, nor necessarily the best proponent of causes
related to their interests.4 Hillary Clinton, for example, was a white,
sixty-nine-year-old, former First Lady, Democrat, with a very certain
set of values, ideologies, policy preferences, life experiences, affilia-
tions, and character traits. In the age of intersectional identity
politics, many people who might have thought that it is time for the
United States to elect a female president could still reasonably
believe—and apparently did in fact believe—that she was not the
one they would have liked as president. In other words, other consid-
erations that figure into a citizen’s choice of leader in a democracy,
such as ideology, competence, and character, can reasonably out-
weigh one’s preference to electing the first woman president.
Indeed, not all women voted for the female candidate in the last
presidential election,5 and there are good reasons to appreciate this
fact, in and of itself: we should not want people to vote for (or against)
a candidate just because of his or her membership in a specific
identity group. While gender might be a relevant consideration in
the rational choice of a leader (for symbolic reasons, functional ones,
or both), it would be irrational to vote purely based on gender dis-
tinctions, with no heed to other elements such as the candidate’s
party affiliation, positions, intelligence, charisma, and track record.6
Similarly, a woman president cannot and should not expect uncondi-
tional support from female or feminist voters: they might not agree
with her actions and they might not accept her positions, on gender
issues as on any other topic of public policy.7 The upshot is clear, as
4. This is the primary puzzle explored by Michael Eric Dyson, in THE BLACK PRES-
IDENCY: BARACK OBAMA AND THE POLITICS OF RACE IN AMERICA X (2016) (“[Obama’s]
presidency . . . raises the question of how much closer the election of a single black man
may bring us to a more just and inclusive society.”). A starkly critical answer to the
question is suggested by William A. Darity Jr., How Barack Obama Failed Black
Americans, ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016
/12/how-barack-obama-failed-black-americans/511358 [http://perma.cc/M3Z9-9BER].
5. See, e.g., Alec Tyson & Shiva Maniam, Behind Trump’s victory: Divisions by race,
gender, education, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 9, 2016), http://pewresearch.org/fact-tank
/2016/11/09/behind-trumps-victory-divisions-by-race-gender-education [http://perma.cc
/7VQ8-YWT7] (citing exit poll results according to which 42% of women voters elected
Donald Trump).
6. There is evidence that voters understand this as well. See, e.g., DEBORAH JORDAN
BROOKS, HE RUNS, SHE RUNS: WHY GENDER STEREOTYPES DO NOT HARM WOMEN CANDI-
DATES 73–79 (2013) (describing comprehensive data showing a minor role for gender stereo-
types in voters’ choice of elected off icials, albeit in sub-presidency levels of government).
7. For an illustrative collection of arguments of the kind leveled against Hillary
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nothing stated to this point is new: the first female presidency, if and
when it arrives, would be a singularly historic event, but it would also
just be a single presidency—with all the varying pains and pleasures
that constituencies derive from their singularly different leaders.
Perhaps an actual feminist reform of the presidency is needed.
We might imagine a gendered modification to the institution of the
President of the United States that would go beyond the historical
significance of the fact that a woman had a chance to hold the office
at one time or another. One way to do this is to look back in time,
before looking forward again into the future. The U.S. presidency
has been occupied by very different persons over the nearly two and
a half centuries since the establishment of the office, each with
distinct positions and affiliations. People of different beliefs and
expectations celebrated some and decried others, and most have felt
a little bit of both toward all. One obvious thing however that was
not exceptional about any of the presidents to have so far held the
office was the fact that they were all men. The reason, of course,
was that only men were ever seriously up for election to the presi-
dency in the history of the U.S., up to the 2016 election.
Think of the richness of male leadership this fact has enabled
the U.S. polity to experience over the generations: while not nearly
representative of the diverse identities and communities that com-
prise it, the U.S. constituency did get to be governed by Democrats
and Republicans, conservatives, liberals, and centrists, Northerners
and Southerners, highbrow intellectuals and down-to-earth popu-
lists, Episcopalians, Unitarians, Presbyterians, Methodists, Baptists,
Quakers, and a Catholic, whites and an African American, lawyers,
soldiers, farmers, teachers, businessmen, journalists, governors,
senators, congressmen, an engineer, an actor, an athlete, men in
their 40s, 50s, 60s, and 70s, healthy and disabled, and so forth.
Clearly, the first woman president, when she arrives, will not
be all of that. She will only present a sliver of what female political
leadership—to the extent that such a thing exists—is like, and she
will only represent a sliver of what the U.S. body politic is made of.
Clearly, to get an idea of the potential that a “female presidency”
holds for the U.S., comparable to the one we have about male lead-
ership, a single such presidency cannot do. Indeed, it would seem
that to level the proverbial playing field, in terms of both corrective
Clinton, see FALSE CHOICES: THE FAUX FEMINISM OF HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON 25 (Liza
Featherstone ed., 2016). On the other side of the aisle, see Jessica Valenti, Opinion: The
fake feminism of Sarah Palin, WASH. POST (May 30, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/28/AR2010052802263.html [http://perma.cc/X7SG
-Y8AP].
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justice and prolific and pluralist experiences, we would need to have
some forty women presidents in a row—from hereon and for the next
several generations. This Article suggests such a thought experi-
ment and seeks to show that there are several good reasons to con-
sider a new constitutional norm that would require all candidates
for the next forty U.S. presidencies to be women, while no men would
be allowed on major party tickets.
This sounds like a radical reform, and in the context of the U.S.
constitutional system its political feasibility indeed seems far-
fetched. But the purpose of this Article is to illustrate that if you
think about this long enough and consider the main arguments, it
is in fact difficult to fully and rationally oppose this view. A rule
that would ensure that the next forty presidents are women turns
out to be an attractively just policy, with few social drawbacks, and
with a capacity to transcend ideological and sectorial divides in its
favor (in this it also differs from comparable reforms that would
secure representation for other minorities in the presidency, as I
elaborate below). This does not mean the reform is on its way, but
starting to imagine reform is certainly a good point of departure.
Perhaps more accessibly, the Article can be read as a thought exper-
iment locating feminist constitutionalism in the realm of inter-
generational justice. It explores the contours of a sequential model
of corrective justice, applying a heightened version of affirmative
action to a unitary institution of governance, usually considered the
most important in the country, that has also been purely restricted
to men for the entirety of its existence. This context presents a
unique analytical challenge for normative theory, and the discussion
of what I term the forty female presidents rule reveals that there is
room for innovation in tackling such problems of gender inequality
in the intergenerational sphere.
In what follows, I first discuss the meaning of the idea of a
“female presidency” (Part I). The purpose of this Part is to establish
the modest point that the gender of our president matters, and not
only to his or her voters. Having only men presidents in the past has
qualitatively affected the institution of the presidency, and therefore
introducing the forty female presidents rule will also have real-life
implications to the office of the executive. Part II then describes the
idea of, and main justifications for, the forty female presidents rule.
Although it derives from the logic of affirmative action and reparatory
justice, I focus mostly on the benefits the suggested rule offers
society as a whole, and consider more briefly the justice-for-women
aspects of the model. Arguing from general social benefits is sup-
posed to attract greater support for the suggested model, and also
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treads what seems to me the less obvious grounds for its adoption.
Part III discusses the main rejoinders to the model. It considers ex-
ternal critiques, focusing on the ostensible injustices to men and to
voters more generally from the exclusion of men from the presidency,
as well as critiques that are internal to the model, asking why
should it be limited to women (rather than other historically subor-
dinated groups), and why it should be limited to the presidency
(rather than other elected offices that have been subject to past
exclusions). Not all of the challenges to the model are fully resolv-
able, and yet I believe it retains much persuasive force. At the least,
it is meant to expose our fairness reflexes and our normative imagi-
nations to the possibility of institutionally contingent corrections to
past practices that dare to intervene in constitutional fixtures.
I. THE IDEA OF THE FEMALE PRESIDENCY
The defeat of Hillary Clinton in the 2016 presidential election
was a sour end to what may be considered a “good year” for women
in political leadership in post-industrialized democracies. It came
four months after the selection of Theresa May as Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom,8 one of Europe’s two largest economies, the
other being Germany, led since 2005 by Angela Merkel.9 In the United
Nations, outgoing Secretary General Ban Ki-moon publicly called
for the member states to elect a woman to succeed him, for the first
time ever;10 although another man—António Guterres—was eventu-
ally selected.11 Other noteworthy international institutions are already
led by women, including the International Monetary Fund (Christine
Lagarde) and the World Health Organization (Margaret Chan).12 Few
would disagree that a leaders’ summit involving these countries and
institutions would be a unique and notable sight, reflecting an
8. Sheena McKenzie, Theresa May becomes new British Prime Minister, CNN (July 14,
2016, 4:23 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/13/europe/theresa-may-david-cameron
-british-prime-minister/index.html [https://perma.cc/ZR3H-RUAB].
9. Angela Merkel Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 27, 2017, 8:53 AM), http://www.cnn
.com/2012/12/30/world/europe/angela-merkel---fast-facts/index.html [https://perma.cc
/J4MP-MQPQ].
10. Edith M. Lederer, UN chief says he’d like a woman to be next secretary-general,
AP (Aug. 16, 2016), https://apnews.com/40016094e318463bafa7c00126f47da1/un-chief
-says-hed-woman-be-next-secretary-general [http://perma.cc/PUJ5-KQR5].
11. António Guterres appointed next UN Secretary-General by acclamation, U.N.
(Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55285#.WcVmNmXEldc
[http://perma.cc/AK8X-FN3K].
12. Radhika Sanghani, Just 9 of the 73 ‘most powerful people in the world’ are women,
TELEGRAPH (Nov. 4, 2015, 4:48 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-busi
ness/11975481/Forbes-power-list-2015-Women-make-up-just-9-of-the-73-most-powerful
.html [http://perma.cc/6K6C-DFTT].
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undeniable cumulative shift in gender politics and in equality of
political opportunity in the twenty-first century. Though if it would
also signify a shift in the nature and quality of leadership is unclear.
In other words, beyond symbolics, we must still consider whether
the gender of our leaders in fact matters.
There is ample evidence today to support the belief that it does,
even if we do not exactly know how or why. Women tend to perform
differently than men in situations of political decision-making in
executive, administrative, and judicial functions. They seem to exhibit
a greater tendency than men toward peace and reconciliation in
situations of conflict.13 Even if “[v]ery few women seek political offices
with the intention of representing women’s interests per se,”14 they
are still more likely than men to show a concern to the special social
conditions of women and to spheres of human experience shared
mostly by women.15 There is evidence that, as judges, women tend
to be harsher in sentencing criminal defendants,16 and less paterna-
listically forgiving than men to female offenders,17 but more receptive
to gender-related wrongs, such as women’s claims of employment
discrimination.18 Whether women are likely to be more “feminist” in
their ideological attitudes—to support rules and rulings that benefit
women over the status quo—is a question open for debate and con-
textual analysis.19 Still, thanks to some combination of nature and
13. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, How Women Could Save the World, If Only We Would
Let Them: From Gender Essentialism to Inclusive Security, 28 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
271, 271–72 (2017) (reviewing quantitative and qualitative studies indicating that
women’s participation in international conflict resolution tends to promote values of
peace and reconciliation).
14. Virginia Sapiro, Research Frontier Essay: When Are Interests Interesting? The
Problem of Political Representation of Women, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 701, 711 (1981).
15. Id.
16. See, e.g., Darrell Steffensmeier & Chris Hebert, Women and Men Policymakers:
Does the Judge’s Gender Affect the Sentencing of Criminal Defendants?, 77 SOC. FORCES
1163, 1174 (1999) (f inding “female judges on average are more likely to incarcerate
offenders . . . and to sentence those imprisoned to slightly longer sentences . . . than are
male judges.”).
17. See Max Schanzenbach, Racial and Sex Disparities in Prison Sentences: The
Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 90 (2005)
(concluding “a greater proportion of female judges on the bench is associated with a
lower sex disparity for the sentencing of serious crimes.”).
18. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Female Justices, Feminism, and the Politics of Judicial
Appointment: A Re-Examination, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 297, 312 (2010) (reviewing—
while critiquing—empirical studies that have shown “a clear and statistically significant
link between a judge’s gender and voting behavior in gender cases,” an effect that is
“particularly clear and consistent in cases involving claims of employment discrimination
based on sex or gender under Title VII”).
19. Compare Michele L. Swers, Are Women More Likely to Vote for Women’s Issue
Bills than Their Male Colleagues?, 23 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 435, 440 (1998) (f inding “gender
exerts a substantial influence, though secondary to ideology, on legislators’ votes on
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nurture, their political behavior is often nonetheless distinguishable
from that of men20—and that is the important point for the purposes
of the current Article.
If women in politics are not a mere replication of men in politics,
then we have been missing something by never electing a woman as
our leader. This might be a different style of leadership or manage-
ment,21 a different set of beliefs, attitudes, or understandings, a differ-
ent vocabulary or analytical perspective, a different collection of life
experiences or outlooks. This is of course a richly developed—if
contested—element of feminist literature. As cultural feminists
have demonstrated extensively, women can be shown to share a
distinct set of ethical and conceptual categories and sensibilities
that have been missing from public life for too long.22 Although
espousing a competing narrative of women’s liberation, power (“radi-
cal”) feminism has also insisted as much, in its claim that the
subordination of women has effectively precluded the elocution of an
independently female voice in public (and private) life.23 Even those
critical of the idea of a distinct female “voice,” seeing in it an anach-
ronistic reification of gender roles and stereotypes,24 cannot deny
the liberating (to liberal feminists) or destabilizing (to postmodern
feminists) force of having women hold “men’s” positions and make
“male” choices, including ones detrimental to women, such as going
to war or cutting welfare payments.
Whatever feminist (or nonfeminist) position one takes, the fact
is that we do not know what a “female presidency” means in the
U.S. since it has never been tried. It might be distinguishable in
consistent, impactful ways from a “male presidency,” and it might
turn out to be significant in diverse and contradictory ways. We
women’s issues”) with Dixon, supra note 18, at 334 (claiming “there is, in fact, no female-
feminist jurisprudential correlation”).
20. For a review of indicative literature, see Richard L. Ogmundson, Does it Matter
if Women, Minorities and Gays Govern?: New Data Concerning an Old Question, 30 CAN.
J. SOC. 315, 316 (2005) (stating “females in authority positions differ from males in both
their attitudes and their behaviour.”).
21. See, e.g., Alice H. Eagly & Mary C. Johannesen-Schmidt, The Leadership Styles
of Women and Men, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 781, 794–95 (2001).
22. For some of the most famous pronouncements, see CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIF-
FERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT 2 (1982); ROBIN
WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 5–6 (1997).
23. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND
LAW 45 (1987) (stating “I say, give women equal power in social life. Let what we say
matter, then we will discourse on questions of morality. Take your foot off our necks,
then we will hear in what tongue women speak.”).
24. See, e.g., id. at 39 (claiming “[w]omen value care because men have valued us
according to the care we give them, . . . [w]omen think in relational terms because our
existence is defined in relation to men. . . . [T]he damage of sexism is real, and reifying
that into differences is an insult to our possibilities.” ).
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have good reasons to believe that such a thing exists though, and
therefore it ought to become part of a nation’s collective life story as
a republican democracy, if it is to finally fulfill its egalitarian and
pluralist ideals of membership and leadership. Some people would
surely learn to value and appreciate the political possibilities re-
vealed by female presidents; just as others are likely to prefer the
male alternative after all. The current Article takes no stake in that
question—it just accepts as its premise that it is a question we
ought to finally explore through politics.
II. THE NEXT FORTY PRESIDENTS
A. The Model
Under the “forty female presidents rule,” no men would be
allowed on the ballot for the next forty presidencies, from hereon and
for several generations—basically replicating the status of women
in presidential elections since independence to the very near past,
de jure or de facto.
Why forty? First, because this is a catchy proximate to the
number of male presidents the U.S. has elected since George Wash-
ington. The exact number is forty-five, but “the forty-five female
presidents rule” lacks the elegance and brevity of the round-num-
bered title, and since part of the project—if it ever came to political
mobilization—will have to gain public appeal, aesthetics matter (to
some extent). In addition, the last four or five presidential cycles
have arguably already begun to relax some of the systemic biases
entrenched in the electoral process and in the executives it has
generated—with the election of an African American president, the
presidential candidacy of a woman in a major party, the nomination
of a Jewish senator and a female governor to major-party vice-
presidential candidacies, and the non-trivial primary campaigns and
cabinet and judicial appointments of other women and members of
minorities. We can therefore treat these last several administrations
as a transition period, laying the ground for the full gendered re-
form of the next forty presidencies.
Still, there is no sanctity in the number forty, and one can
imagine a shorter—but long enough—period of exclusively female
presidencies that would achieve most of the goals of the proposed
reform. The exact extent of the project could therefore be calibrated
on the go, contingent primarily on the achievement of a sufficient
diversity of women presidents over the years, in terms of ideology,
party affiliation, background, and intersectionality (i.e., representa-
tion of other identity groups).
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The idea of reserving certain seats or positions, even in demo-
cratically elected bodies, for members of specific identity groups, is
not new. Other countries have done so openly, usually for one of two
reasons: to secure some degree of representation for women (and
sometimes other minorities), notably in developing countries with
traditionally patriarchal political cultures (e.g., Afghanistan, Alge-
ria, Bangladesh, China, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Morocco, Niger, Paki-
stan, Saudi Arabia, Uganda);25 or to preserve an intergroup balance
of power in a multicultural setting, from token assurances of repre-
sentation (e.g., Croatia, Slovenia)26 to structured arrangements of
consociational power-sharing (e.g., Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Burundi, Lebanon).27 Informally, this has become a consistently fol-
lowed practice in the U.S. and other countries in such areas as judicial
and ministerial positions, some of which are reserved to appointees
of specific group affiliations, more or less explicitly: it is, for example,
difficult today to seriously imagine an all-white, let alone an all-male,
appointed court or cabinet.
What is unique about the forty female presidents model, how-
ever, is that it is not about representation within a collegial body or
a class of public officials. Rather, it is directed at occupying a single
elected office which cannot be shared, at least not contemporaneously.
If the reform is adopted, therefore, and assuming no other change
is made in the relevant constitutional (and biological) fabric, this
would mean that for the next 160–320 years (depending on single-
or double-term tenures), the U.S. will only have women presidents.
That is a good thing, and below I explain why.
B. Justifications
1. Justice for Women, Corrective and Affirmative
For over two centuries, legal, institutional, economic, and cultural
barriers have intentionally and effectively foreclosed the possibility
of a woman’s election to the Office of the President of the United
25. See Gender quotas around the world, QUOTA DATABASE, http://www.quotaproject
.org [http://perma.cc/2X2Y-9VAY]. These countries have legislated quantitative quotas
for seats for women in parliament. See also Aili Mari Tripp & Alice Kang, The Global
Impact of Quotas: On the Fast Track to Increased Female Legislative Representation, 41
COMP. POL. STUD. 338, 338 (2008) (describing the significant achievements to women’s
political representation that have resulted from the burgeoning use of parliamentary
gender quotas).
26. Gender quotas around the world, supra note 25.
27. See Mona Lena Krook & Diana Z. O’Brien, The Politics of Group Representation:
Quotas for Women and Minorities Worldwide, 42 COMP. POL. 253, 257–58 (2010) (review-
ing state-mandated quotas for minorities in single or lower houses of parliament).
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States and, for most of that time, the possibility of a woman’s serious
candidacy to the Office as well. It is fair to assume that not many
people today still think this is a morally defensible state of affairs,
nor that it was objectively justifiable at any time in the past (even
if we can rationally relate to why some people might have thought
so in earlier generations). To the extent that there are people who
still support such a policy,28 this Article is not meant for them. If,
however, you believe that not allowing women to become presi-
dents—as, of course, a host of other public offices, though they are
not the focus here—is unjustified, then you must agree that all women
have been subjected for generations to an egregiously discrimina-
tory wrong, which warrants correction.
The first and immediate way to correct the wrong is to stop it,
that is, to prevent it from carrying into the future. Many decades of
fights for women’s franchise and civil and economic equality, in
addition to other changes in cultural and social norms, seem to be
getting us closer to that point. The election of a woman as president
seems today an actual possibility, at least one not completely fore-
closed by discriminatory structures. Women in the U.S. today serve
with relative regularity as governors, senators, cabinet ministers,
Supreme Court justices, university presidents, and chief officers of
corporations. This is of course not to say that gender discrimination
and the gaps it begets in income, status, and well-being are relics of
the past—none of these roles are held in equal measures by mem-
bers of both genders, and many institutions like banks, churches,
and the military are still far behind in positioning women in high-
ranking offices.29 It does tell us, however, that the political sphere
can today fathom a woman president—an idea completely unrealis-
tic just a few decades ago.
28. See Dominique Mosbergen, Female CEO Says Women ‘Shouldn’t Be President’
Because Of ‘Different Hormones,’ ‘Biblical Reasoning,’ HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.huff ingtonpost.com/2015/04/15/ceo-women-shouldnt-be-president-cheryl
-rios_n_7067564.html [http://perma.cc/ENF7-K8PV]. Individual sensibilities notwithstand-
ing, some conservative religious traditions:
[S]uch as Catholicism, conservative Protestantism, Orthodox Judaism,
Mormonism, and some sects of Islam, . . . promote strict gender relation-
ships based on male headship and women’s submission. These religions tend
to emphasize ontological differences between men and women, noting that
men are predisposed to leadership, activity, and a strong work ethic, while
women are naturally nurturing, passive, and receptive.
Kelsy C. Burke, Women’s Agency in Gender-Traditional Religions: A Review of Four
Approaches, 6 SOC. COMPASS 122, 122 (2012).
29. For comparative data on such persisting disparities in the post-industrialized
world, see, e.g., Gender wage gap, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/gender-wage
-gap.htm [http://perma.cc/5XQA-FBK2]; Share of employed who are managers, by sex,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/gender/data/employed-who-are-managers-by-sex.htm [http://
perma.cc/4WWC-P3MA].
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Making institutions eliminate a discriminatory policy only pre-
vents the wrongs of the future, though; it does not correct the wrongs
of the past. The injuries imposed on generations of women due to the
elimination of access to the highest political office in the land still
stand, and call for rectification. These are the harms to women who
sought, or wanted to seek, election but were denied the possibility
to do so through formal exclusions or other means of social ordering;
women who would have sought political careers but whose ambitions
were curtailed by the prevailing norms against female leadership;
and women who sought to identify in the presidency and experience
the civic bond it is supposed to offer to its subjects, but could not do
so because they knew this office excludes them and all of the other
members of their gender group.30 Of course, most of those women of
past generations cannot enjoy the reparatory benefits of any correc-
tive measure, rather it would be distributed to the future members
of their identity group. While it does not make the harm whole, the
demand from society to compensate for it—in a way that would repair
the damage done looking forward—is nonetheless just.
There is no need to belabor the point. The arguments in support
of compensatory entitlements for current members of groups that
have in the past been subject to systemic legal, political, cultural, or
economic subjugation have been hashed in detail in the literature.31
Such entitlements can come in diverse forms such as monetary repa-
rations,32 territorial spheres of self-rule,33 and affirmative action in the
access to public resources and positions.34 The consistent exclusion of
30. Notably, I am not considering here the harm to women who wanted to vote for a
woman but could not, or wanted to identify with a woman president. These are costs in-
curred not only by women, and will be tended to below. See infra Section II.B.2. The point
here is the message of exclusion, which was uniquely directed against women, not men.
31. See, e.g., David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of
Slavery and Jim Crow, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 1376–77 (2004) (suggesting, under a correc-
tive justice moral paradigm, a National Rectif ication Project that would seek to erase the
remaining structural results of past racial injustices); Margaret Urban Walker, Restorative
Justice and Reparations, 37 J. SOC. PHIL. 377, 377–79 (2006) (locating the justif iability
and feasibility of compensatory mechanisms in the analytical context of restorative, rather
than corrective, justice). For a critique of the perception that past wrongs invoke con-
tinuing entitlements that can and should be remedied by current generations, see
Jeremy Waldron, Redressing Historic Injustice, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 135, 143 (2002).
32. See, e.g., Thomas McCarthy, Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the
Morality and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 32 POL. THEORY 750, 750 (2004); Ta-Nehisi
Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com
/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631 [http://perma.cc/UE8V-C8ZV].
33. See, e.g., Tamar Meisels, Can Corrective Justice Ground Claims to Territory?, 11
J. POL. PHIL. 65, 65 (2003); Douglas Sanderson, Redressing the Right Wrong: The Argument
from Corrective Justice, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 93, 93 (2012).
34. See, e.g., GERTRUDE EZORSKY, RACISM AND JUSTICE: THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION 1 (1991); RACE AND REPRESENTATION: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 9 (Robert Post &
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women from public office, and more specifically from the highest
executive office in the land, surely falls within this scope of the wrongs
that would invoke a corrective entitlement, and I follow the existing
justifications for such measures. At the same time, we should not
overstate the extent of the harm imposed upon women qua women
due to their generations-long exclusion from the presidency. Women
have been subject to much harsher forms of subjugation than the
inaccessibility of presidential office—in the biased and discrimina-
tory institutional design, governance, and legal regulation of politics,
markets, and families, and in the cultures of sex and subordination
that have underlined these social constructs. Not being able to be-
come president was an injustice to women, but it fails even to hint
at the extent of gendered injustice embedded in our civilization, and
so the argument for the forty female presidents rule cannot rely on
this argument alone.
Thus, while the exclusion of women from the presidency was first
and foremost an injustice to women, I turn below to focus on argu-
ments that have to do with general injustices, that is, with the harms
imposed on the body politic as a whole as a result of the exclusion of
women. I believe that in this context the argument for the forty female
presidents rule holds the most currency.
2. Fairness to the Governed
The effective exclusion of women from the presidency means
that, for generations, Americans have been denied the possibility of
being led (politically) by a woman. This has been a social loss for
both rights-based and instrumentalist reasons; I detail each below.
a. Voting as Autonomy
One of the cornerstones of membership in a democratic political
community—of equal citizenship—is the right to participate freely
in the election of the representatives that would govern the polity.
Indeed, access to the electoral process is often defined as a “funda-
mental” right in a democracy,35 since it is in the periodic freedom to
vote for or against our representatives and leaders that we iterate
our political membership and sustain the exercise of self-rule and
Michael Rogin eds., 1998); Owen M. Fiss, Affirmative Action as a Strategy of Justice, 17
PHIL. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Affirmative Action, Caste, and Cul-
tural Comparisons, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1311, 1311 (1999).
35. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966); Joshua A.
Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143,
145 (2008).
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government by consent.36 This means that democracy cannot deny
members of their right to vote, and exceptions can be accepted only
due to a weighty public interest, like the exclusion of the yet-unin-
formed opinions of minors, or, more controversially, those of criminal
convicts.37 Discounts and exclusions based on race and gender have
therefore been set aside in past generations, as equal citizenship
became true to its name, and implicit exclusionary strategies—e.g.,
gerrymandering and voter identification laws—are still being nego-
tiated and litigated to this day.38
Access to the ballot is of course only one side of a meaningful
right to vote. It also has to do with the availability of actual choice
in election. Being allowed to vote for only a single candidate (with
abstentions not counted), for example, hardly amounts to an exer-
cise of free and equal citizenship—as sham elections in autocratic
regimes worldwide prove with regularity. A democratic electoral
system is required to allow equal access onto the ballot, to enable
anyone who is willing and capable to run for office to actually do so,
and to have an equal chance of getting elected (again, more or less
consensual restrictions may apply, e.g., age or criminal background).
While this principle is often cast as an individual’s right to run for
office—emanating from rights to civic equality, freedom of speech,
and personal liberty—I focus here on the functional understanding
of the right to run for office as a means for fulfilling the meaningful
right to vote. Only in a system that accommodates multiple and di-
verse candidates for election—only where choice is immanent to the
electoral process—can one genuinely state that a meaningful right
to vote exists.39
The argument for significant choice in the election of our repre-
sentatives is an extension of the familiar argument about the
essentiality of choice for autonomy. To be truly autonomous, that is,
to have the capacity of self-authorship, of writing your own life story,
the argument goes, we must have access to meaningful choice in
36. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86
IND. L.J. 1289, 1338–54 (2011).
37. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Ballots and Bullets: The Exceptional History of the
Right to Vote, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1345, 1362–71 (2003).
38. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: From Anti-
Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOW. L.J. 741, 742 (2006). For the latest—
certainly not the last—pronouncement of the Supreme Court on redistricting, see Cooper
v. Harris, 581 U.S. ___, *2 (2017). In its October 2017 term it is scheduled to decide a
voting registration case: A. Philip Randolph Institute v. Husted, 838 F.3d 699 (6th Cir.
2016), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3562 (U.S. May 30, 2017) (No. 16-980).
39. See Bernhard Wessels & Hermann Schmitt, Meaningful choices, political supply,
and institutional effectiveness, 27 ELECTORAL STUD. 19, 20 (2008) (suggesting a method
for evaluating the “supply side” of democratic elections based on the existence of a
“meaningful choice set” to elect from).
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significant life junctures.40 If our condition—physical, mental, in-
tellectual, or material—precludes the availability of meaningful choice
in life-authoring moments, then we can hardly be said to be suffi-
ciently autonomous, even if we are not subject to explicit coercion in
the direction of our life. The essentiality of choice for autonomy
imposes significant demands upon public institutions that are en-
trusted, either morally or legally, with the preservation and promotion
of individual autonomy. It requires these institutions to recognize
or enable significant alternatives for people to choose from or steer
among in the central spheres of their lives, such as family, work,
education, and community.41
Applying this liberal argument to the electoral process extends
the autonomy-as-choice theory to a civic-republican context: it sug-
gests that the act of voting should be properly understood as a life-
authoring moment for the engaged citizen. In other words, the act
of voting is an exercise in autonomy, not merely in citizenship. Citi-
zenship is not only a mode of living socially, but also an added layer
in the multiple spheres of self-authorship we engage in throughout
our lives. In voting, one not only fulfills a “civic duty,” 42 but also de-
fines and develops his or her own self through deliberation, discre-
tion, and decision regarding one’s social surroundings. This experience
should therefore be subject to the same moral requirements invoked
by other significant life junctures, including the sustenance of signifi-
cant choice among sufficiently distinct alternatives.
This degree of sufficient choice has been denied to generations
of voters, devoid of the possibility of electing a woman for president,
and so their autonomy has been violated.
Of course, the effective exclusion of women from presidential
ballots for centuries did not completely eliminate the electorate’s
choice. Significantly distinct ideologies have been regularly repre-
sented by competing male candidates, and, at least arguably, the
election of one male candidate over another has had real impact on
the progress and prosperity of the nation, if not the world. This fact
in itself, however, does not diminish the harm inflicted to voters’
autonomies for generations due to the foreclosure of the possibility to
40. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 373 (1986) (stating “[f ]or a person
to enjoy an autonomous life . . . [t]here must . . . be adequate options available for him
to choose from.”).
41. See, e.g., Hanoch Dagan, Autonomy, Pluralism, and Contract Law Theory, 76 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 19, 27 (2013) (explaining “given the diversity of acceptable human
goods from which autonomous people should be able to choose and their distinct consti-
tutive values, the state must recognize a sufficiently diverse set of robust frameworks
for people to organize their lives.”).
42. See, e.g., Philip Jones & John Hudson, Civic Duty and Expressive Voting: Is
Virtue its Own Reward?, 53 KYKLOS 3, 3 (2000).
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vote for women. Robbed of the possibility to vote for a woman candi-
date, voters have been denied a set of significant choices that could,
and likely would, have been available to them without the gendered
exclusion. They had the capacity to choose, but the choice presented
to them, if not completely sham, was tainted by patriarchal manipu-
lation. Voters did not get to consider the possible costs and benefits
of the presidency of any single woman, nor of the notion of a “female
presidency” as a whole. People’s capacity to define their beliefs and
preferences, and to act upon them, with regard to a large set of viable
leadership options, has been curtailed. Their autonomous selves,
realized through voting, were significantly diminished.
b. Selection Effects
The exclusion of women as presidential candidates also meant
that the group of people that has constituted the country’s pool of
potential presidents has always been seriously limited. Of the indi-
viduals ostensibly capable of serving as president, an enormous share
was blocked from accessing the office. This means that the U.S. polity
has necessarily missed out on some good candidates and, indeed,
some good presidents. Furthermore, over the course of more than
two centuries, it is likely that some of the excluded potential candi-
dates would have been better presidents than the ones elected, and
that some of these better candidates were also likely to have been
elected. Due to the exclusion of women from the presidency, the aver-
age quality of the U.S. Chief Executive has therefore been dimin-
ished—the country missed out on some good presidents, some better
than the ones it got.
This is a familiar social cost associated with discriminatory
exclusions in any context: if we fail to enable persons with disabili-
ties to physically access schools or workplaces, if we fail to enable
parents to bearably balance their home and work responsibilities,
if we dismiss LGBT servicemembers from the military—we are
effectively lowering the quality of our institutions and compromising
their potential productivity. In the context of the presidency one
might argue that the social cost is even more considerable, since
successful political leadership has to do—at least to some degree—
with the diversity of the human condition and an understanding of
the life experiences of the governed. While of course any individual
president cannot channel the diverse experiences and conditions of
all the groups and classes in society, on average, over generations,
we should expect an elected office to do just that, and we should
count the inclusiveness of this channeling function as a measure of
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success of the presidency. Without women presidents, the possibility
of inclusiveness is off the table.
True, typical eligibility-for-office rules often exclude large groups,
some of whose members could potentially be better candidates than
the ones allowed on the ballot. The U.S. Constitution lets only “natu-
ral born Citizen[s]” who are thirty-five years or older serve as presi-
dent.43 Clearly, many naturalized immigrants, and many younger
Americans, are likely to be highly qualified to serve as president,
indeed more so than some of the men who have held the job under
the existing rule, and maybe even thanks to the existing rule (since
they might have had to run against, and could have possibly lost to,
some of the better candidates excluded by the Constitution). There
are reasons to question both the wisdom and legitimacy of such rules,
which are basically paternalistic means of precluding us from voting
for people, who are perhaps less likely on average to be good presi-
dents, through the use of a blunt proxy mechanism.44 At the same
time, such rules at least try to reflect a rational view of presidential
qualifications. In other words, they assume—correctly or not—that
the social cost incurred by losing some good candidates is worth the
benefit of excluding some characteristics that are, on average, likely
to be inadequate for the office of the presidency. All of this, of course,
is irrelevant to the class of women, whose exclusion from presidency
imposes only social costs with no social benefits.
So due to the effective exclusion of women from the presidency,
the pool of candidates was significantly curtailed, making us miss
some potentially good presidents, and some likely better presidents
than the ones we had, for no defensible reason. The thing that was
taken from the citizens of the U.S.—the right to live in a country
whose president is a woman—ought to be given back, not only as a
remedy for violating individuals’ rights as free and autonomous voters,
but also so that they get to enjoy in their future presidents the life
experiences of women and all that they bring to leadership. One way
to fulfill both ends is to decide that from now on, and for several
generations to come, presidents will be only women.
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
44. For a history and a critique of the rule, see Lawrence Friedman, An Idea Whose
Time Has Come—The Curious History, Uncertain Effect, and Need for Amendment of the
“Natural Born Citizen” Requirement for the Presidency, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 137, 139–40
(2007); Jill A. Pryor, The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An
Approach for Resolving Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 YALE L.J. 881, 885–88
(1988). On the age limit, see Anthony D’Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The “Easy
Case” of the Under-Aged President, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 250, 250–52 (1989); Stanley Fish,
Still Wrong After All These Years, 6 L. & PHIL. 401, 403–05 (1987).
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3. Quality Voting, Relieved of Some Identity Politics
In his Republican primary victory speech, Donald Trump notori-
ously said about his democratic rival that “if Hillary Clinton were
a man, I don’t think she’d get 5 percent of the vote. The only thing
she’s got going is the women’s card. . . . And the beautiful thing is,
women don’t like her.” 45 Trump was mocking Clinton for poorly
playing the identity politics of gender—for trying (unsuccessfully, by
his account) to get people, and specifically women, to vote for her be-
cause she is a woman, and not because of any specific qualification,
characteristic, or ideology she might have possessed. Intentionally
or not, he was also mocking the multitudes who had voted for Clinton
in the Democratic primaries (and who would vote for her in the gen-
eral election), implying that they make their political choices not
according to the merit or worth of the candidate, but rather by
following some irrational sense of class kinship or affinity, in this
case, aligned by gender.
At the same time, the deflating nature of the campaign strategy
hinted by Trump’s statement—attack the person, not the issues—
should not distract us from the well-documented reality that many
people do in fact vote according to class affinities (elect the candi-
date who is like you according to some identity measure—gender,
race, class, religion, ethnicity, education, income, life experiences).
Others take the group identity of a candidate to be a significant con-
sideration in their decision-making process when choosing a candi-
date to vote for (it is important that we have a president who is a
member of a gender, race, class, etc. group).46 In other words, identity
politics is a real thing, and it carries significant force in electoral
dynamics, especially ones so focused on person and personality—
arguably, none more so than presidential elections.
Electoral identity politics can have a redeeming social potential
in some contexts. To begin with, identity politics can raise public
awareness to important social injustices of class, gender, and race.
45. Jose A. DelReal & Anne Gearan, Trump: If Clinton ‘were a man, I don’t think
she’d get 5 percent of the vote,’ WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/04/27/trump-if-clinton-were-a-man-i-don’t-think-shed
-get-5-percent-of-the-vote/?utm_term=.c0254ef17780 [http://perma.cc/QQ4M-WUDC].
46. See, e.g., Kathleen Dolan, Voting for Women in the “Year of the Woman,” 42 AM.
J. POL. SCI. 272, 273 (1998); Eric Plutzer & John F. Zipp, Identity Politics, Partisanship,
and Voting for Women Candidates, 60 PUB. OP. Q. 30, 50 (1996); Michael C. Herron &
Jasjeet S. Sekhon, Black Candidates and Black Voters: Assessing the Impact of Candidate
Race on Uncounted Vote Rates, 67 J. POL. 154, 155 (2005); Atiya Kai Stokes-Brown, Racial
Identity and Latino Vote Choice, 34 AM. POL. RES. 627, 628 (2006); Katherine Tate, The
Political Representation of Blacks in Congress: Does Race Matter?, 26 LEG. STUD. Q. 623,
627 (2001).
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Group identity is real; it is genuinely and intensely experienced by
many people, both as a defining element in one’s own life story and
as a distinguishing factor vis-à-vis non-members.47 Given that group
membership is central to so many of the injustices inflicted by gov-
ernments and majorities on those subject to their power, tapping
identity as a resource for political energy can often support socially
progressive forces, both by setting agendas and consciousness, and
by galvanizing group agency and action.
Going beyond the interest of the specific group, the public interest
in an engaged polity can also be served by exploiting the power of iden-
tity: one way to get a disinterested electorate to re-engage the civic
sphere and be involved in political action is to propose a candidate
with whom members of the group can identify, engendering trust in
a system that has enabled someone “like me” to reach that position,
as well as instilling hope in one’s own potential of “getting there.” 48
The 2008 and 2012 peaks in African American voter turnout, com-
pared to previous decades of presidential elections,49 are widely
understood as one of the collateral social benefits of Barack Obama’s
candidacy: pulling voters, disenfranchised for generations (de jure
or de facto), back into the fold of civic engagement and incentivizing
them to take a stake in the political choices of the constituency.50
Still, as has been argued extensively by its many critics, iden-
tity politics also poses risks to democracy. If it takes precedence over
47. See, e.g., Nancy Fraser, Lecture on Human Values at Stanford University: Social
Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation
(May 2, 1996), https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/f/Fraser98.pdf [http://
perma.cc/BHA4-3DDA]; Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 97, 112 (1991).
48. For an illustrative review of such literature, see Tasha S. Philpot et al., Winning
the Race: Black Voter Turnout in the 2008 Presidential Election, 73 PUB. OP. Q. 995,
999–1002 (2009).
49. See THOM FILE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE DIVERSIFYING ELECTORATE—VOTING
RATES BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN IN 2012 (AND OTHER RECENT ELECTIONS) (2013),
https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-568.pdf [http://perma.cc/FE87-KJPV]; Alan
Flippen, Black Turnout in 1964, and Beyond, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014), https://www.ny
times.com/2014/10/17/upshot/black-turnout-in-1964-and-beyond.html [http://perma.cc
/5UYD-3PET]; MARK HUGO LOPEZ & PAUL TAYLOR, PEW RESEARCH CTR., DISSECTING THE
2008 ELECTORATE: MOST DIVERSE IN U.S. HISTORY (Apr. 30, 2009), http://assets.pew
research.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/reports/108.pdf [http://perma.cc/D2W9-D69A].
50. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Merolla et al., Descriptive Representation, Political Efficacy,
and African Americans in the 2008 Presidential Election, 34 POL. PSYCHOL. 863, 872
(2013) (f inding “evidence that having a descriptive representative at the national level
increases feelings of political efficacy.”). The story gets more complicated, on multiple
axes. The fact of Obama’s racial identity galvanized not only African American voters,
but also affected the choices of white voters, see, e.g., Ray Block Jr., Backing Barack
Because He’s Black: Racially Motivated Voting in the 2008 Election, 92 SOC. SCI. Q. 423,
438 (2011), and other factors—apart from the candidate’s racial identity—also worked
to enhance African American turnout, see, e.g., Philpot et al., supra note 48, at 1002
(stressing the effect of party mobilization on participation).
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other political forces in the determination of an election, it risks
undermining the republican ideal of the citizen as an agent of a
shared common good, who reaps benefits from political membership
that transcends the affiliations of group identity, and who is willing
to shed (some of) her group-identitarian commitments when making
choices that pertain to matters of general welfare.51 In addition, the
quality of voting—measured in the extent of rational consideration
of the alternatives and possible outcomes and its impact on the
choice made at the ballot52—can drop if people choose according to
group affiliation rather than (their understanding of) the ideas,
ideologies, and qualifications of the candidates. Further, when iden-
tity politics are the focus on the electoral campaign, it is harder to
get voters to exercise deliberative modes of democratic engagement—
seeking to exchange views and beliefs with members of other groups
and to enrich one’s set of preferences by taking into account addi-
tional points of view. The stronger the identitarian pull on electoral
politics, the more difficult it becomes to engender cross-group coali-
tions that might defy the distinctions of class and party orthodoxies.
Again, the potential for an engaged and informed voting process
might be curtailed.
Thus, from a (small ‘d’) democratic, as well as a (small ‘r’) republi-
can, point of view, the argument that a voter (female or otherwise)
should vote for a female presidential candidate just because she is
a woman should be rejected. Even if women candidates are on aver-
age more likely than men candidates to support policies that favor
women’s interests53—a questionable assumption, as I pointed out
above—and even if “feminist issues” were the single most salient
factor in choosing a candidate, it would still be possible for a given
female candidate to be “less feminist” than a given male candidate.
True, a feminist voter might rationally decide to treat election
cycles as a repeat game, in which she employs a steady heuristic:
“always vote for the woman.” Assuming (again, not realistically) that
women appear regularly on presidential tickets, and that our feminist
voter regularly belongs to the prevailing majority, this might lead
over time to the election of more feminist presidents, on average.
51. See, e.g., AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 7–36 (2003).
52. For evidence that voters are capable of making quality choices, in the sense of
putting social motivations ahead of immediate personal gains, see Aaron Edlin et al.,
Voting as a Rational Choice: Why and How People Vote To Improve the Well-Being of
Others, 19 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 293, 303–04 (2007). For a critique of the democratic
assumption that voters are capable of making sound choices on economic policy, see
BRYAN CAPLAN, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL VOTER: WHY DEMOCRACIES CHOOSE BAD
POLICIES 2–3 (2008).
53. See Tiffany D. Barnes & Erin C. Cassese, American Party Women: A Look at the
Gender Gap within Parties, 70 POL. RES. Q. 127, 128 (2017).
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Most of us do not treat presidential voting as a strategic game that
spans multiple rounds played once every four years though. Rather,
we try to elect the best president we can have at any given time, and
justifiably so: the stakes are simply too high. Under this premise, it
does seem irrational to choose a president based on nothing but his
or her identity group affiliation, without considering other substan-
tive qualifications. Indeed, in some sense it degrades the voter her-
self, for it requires her to suspend her ability to exercise judgment
and instead to act as a “counted head” in the mobilization of a group
that transcends the individual.
One way we can resolve the challenge presented by the under-
standable pull of identity politics and its detrimental impact on
rational, quality voting is to diminish the identitarian element
involved in the election. In some sense, during the centuries-long
era dominated by white male presidential candidates, this was the
case: the gender, race, and religion of the candidates were all “non-
issues,” since no one seriously questioned the discriminatory norms
they reflected, and so voters were able to focus on other, arguably
more substantive, qualifications of those running for office. Ironically,
the democratizing process that opened up the political field to a di-
versity of newcomers—non-male, non-white candidates—has at the
same time invoked the risk of group cascades trumping individual
discretion and diminishing the rational quality of voting. The forty
female presidents rule would eliminate at least part of this dynamic,
by excluding the “just because she is a woman” factor from the choice
process of voters. It would do so, however, not by cynically imagin-
ing an election that is “gender blind,” but rather by re-homogenizing
the electoral field (in terms of gender), only this time with the
formerly excluded having the full chance of being elected.
Of course, members of other groups would still be subject to the
existing forces that counter rational, identity-independent evalua-
tion of candidates. In a contest between two women candidates, one
black and the other white, race would still be a deciding factor for
some voters, regardless of merit or qualification. At least one, and
arguably the most salient, aspect of presidential identity politics,
however, would be put again off the table for the foreseeable future.
C. Summary
Once we start thinking in terms of overall, over-time systemic
justice, rather than here-and-now individual justice, the argument for
the forty female presidents rule takes on an intuitive appeal. Assume
we kept holding into the future normal, fair, and gender-neutral
elections—elections of the kind that, let’s assume, enabled Hillary
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Clinton to reach the top of a major party ticket even when opposed
by a male presidential candidate. Assume further that women happen
to get elected as president with regularity for the next forty election
cycles, even with men competing as well. It should be very difficult
for anyone to argue conscientiously that something is “wrong” with
an electoral system that keeps producing female winners, especially
given what we know about the past electoral cycles. In other words,
the fact of consistent female presidencies in itself does not raise any
justifiable objection; just as the fact that in the past women were
effectively excluded from presidential politics should not affect the
moral evaluation and possible admiration of the individual men who
have served in that position (of course, that evaluation would also
extend to their roles in perpetuating the exclusion of women).
Given, therefore, that we would not be harmed in any moral or
functional way by the mere result of having only women as presi-
dents, and given that we have had an (undue) exclusivity of men
defining the position of president to this day, it makes sense to let
the system run for a while on the alternative. Existing assumptions
and entrenched institutional forces will get a chance to recalibrate,
but not in a mere adjustment to a single “newcomer.” Rather, with
the full structural impact of a deep change in institutional realities.
This kind of recalibration requires some institutional stability and
foreseeability to become evidently necessary and indeed worthwhile:
it cannot hinge on the political ebbs and flows of the four-year
electoral cycle. To be able to arrive at a genuinely egalitarian equi-
librium, the system of government will first have to learn what it
means to have a female president. This can only be done over the
span of multiple presidencies, since (as noted before) different women
will govern differently, and they will get to do so because they will
be elected not merely for being women, but because their different
political programs will win the day in diverse electoral cycles. Only
the accumulated experiences of generations of people governed by
such different women will be able to fully express in their institu-
tional formations the implications of gender difference on gover-
nance. In short, we know a lot about what it means to be governed
by men; to know what it means to be governed by women we must
be governed by women; there is no shortcut. The forty female presi-
dents rule is the means to accessing that valuable knowledge.
III. REJOINDERS AND REPLIES
Here I consider some of the possible critiques to the forty female
presidents rule. I try to tackle the ones that seem to me the most
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viable or challenging, as well as some that are not as strong but are
likely to be invoked in any debate of the matter and therefore require
a reply. Of course, the forty female presidents rule is hard to swallow
(at least at first), let alone make a reality, given existing political and
constitutional facts of American life, and some of the objections are
significant. The purpose of this Part however is not to establish the
model’s ultimate superiority or immediate feasibility over all other
mechanisms of electoral justice. Rather it is to highlight through dis-
cussion some of its virtues, and to open up the field for more nuanced
reforms that would track its fundamental justifications.
The discussion consists of two parts. The first tackles external
critiques: moral objections to the core of the argument—notably, the
idea that men should not be allowed to run for president, for a signifi-
cant period into the future. The second confronts internal critiques:
challenges to the logical integrity of the argument, namely that if it
is to hold, then it should not limit itself either to women alone, or to
presidential politics alone.
A. External Critiques
1. Correcting One Injustice with Another
The first and perhaps most forceful rejoinder to the forty female
presidents rule closely echoes the familiar critique against affirma-
tive action more generally: the fact that women were excluded in the
past from the presidency does not justify inflicting the same injus-
tice on present and future men, as well as on future voters who might
be interested in voting for men, all of whom bear no individual cul-
pability for bygone practices of gender discrimination. Excluding
men from the presidency for the next century or two, the critique goes,
would send the boys and men of the future many of the similar dis-
paraging messages women were exposed to in generations back: you
are not welcome as our leaders; please adjust your aspirations
accordingly. It would penalize a class of individuals for an evil they
did not commit.
This critique is essentially correct, and like in the section above
setting out the argument for the forty female presidents rule, I do
not intend to tackle it fully. The debate over the morality of affirma-
tive action is well-trodden and does not require rehashing here. To
support the kind of reform envisaged in this Article, one has to
share, at least to a certain extent, a sensibility that accepts the
legitimacy of strategies of affirmative action like the ones employed
today regularly by educational and other institutions, with varying
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degrees of support from the Supreme Court.54 The gist of the point
is that correcting some past injustices could indeed be such a com-
manding social interest (or, in doctrinal terms, an overly compelling
state interest), that innocent people may justifiably be asked to
shoulder the burden of the corrective policy as an expression of their
commitment to membership in a society striving to moral ends.55
True, the suggested model goes far beyond what is today ac-
cepted affirmative action practice—namely, taking group identity
into account as a factor in the distribution of finite resources—in its
insistence on membership in the disenfranchised group as a neces-
sary condition for access to the good. As will be discussed in more
detail below, in the context of the presidency, the wrong inflicted on
those excluded is of a uniquely limited nature, compared to other
contexts of affirmative action: unlike the typical education or em-
ployment setting, the exclusion here is not from some finite public
resource that would normally be generally accessible, but rather from
a post we all have an infinitesimally low chance of acquiring, regard-
less of the design of the electoral process. The primary harm caused
to men by the forty female presidents rule has to do therefore with
the dispiriting message it can be thought to project as to the worth
of men as leaders. This harm, though not inconsequential, can be
mitigated through education and explanation of the policy’s justifi-
cations—its egalitarian foundations, its compensatory justness, and
the social benefits it is expected to generate. Further, in contrast to
the message sent to women during their era of exclusion, men are
assured from the get-go that they will regain the chance to vie for
the presidency in due time: their exclusion is temporary (if extended),
and does not reflect a degrading view of their incapacity to lead.
Still, continues the critique, we have worked so hard for genera-
tions to reach this current blissful point, in which a woman (and
before that, an African American) can become a viable presidential
candidate: we should just let the game be played fairly, now that the
playing field has finally been leveled. We may have already arrived
at the egalitarian ideal to which we should strive. We should not
embark instead on a centuries-long process of score-setting through
wholesale arbitrary exclusion.
54. Compare Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 579 U.S. ___, slip. op. at 19 (2016) (upholding a
university’s racial diversity policy in undergraduate admission) with Ricci v. DeStefano,
557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009) (striking down a city’s decision to invalidate the results of a
firefighters’ promotion test because it failed to qualify any black f irefighters).
55. See ALAN H. GOLDMAN, JUSTICE AND REVERSE DISCRIMINATION 165 (1979) (sug-
gesting “short-run violations of the rule [of competence] are justif ied to create a more
just distribution of benefits by applying the rule itself in future years.” ). For a general
canvas of the debate, see Louis P. Pojman, The Moral Status of Affirmative Action, 6
PUB. AFF. Q. 181, 190–98 (1992).
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The need to correct the past exclusion of women from the presi-
dency, however, is too fundamental to be remedied through the for-
tuitous results of future elections. If what we seek is to expose society
to the reality of the female presidency, then this can only be done
through a prolonged, systematic process that would enable the election
of diverse (female) presidents from different parties and of different
ideologies and life experiences. It does not have to be forty—we
might get there with fewer numbers—but a multitude is necessary.
Further, we must eliminate the possibility of penalizing female
candidates for the failures, or even successes, of previous women
that have held the post—a discriminatory tendency that is a famil-
iar reaction to the average performance of newcomer classes in bas-
tions of old elites, like corporate management, military command,
or governmental politics.56
Relying on the progress already achieved, without a more rigorous
corrective policy, would also unduly discount the impact of moral
licensing and tokenism of people’s choices. The human tendency to
allow oneself to be prejudiced following a nonprejudiced act—in
other words, to reward oneself for “good” behavior with a license to
act “badly”—is well-documented in behavioral research.57 Thus it is
likely to appear that some voters, after casting a ballot in favor of a
woman candidate, would feel relieved to go back to the old and
familiar practice of voting for men.58 Ironically, having a woman
actually elected president could even exacerbate the effect, as the
existence of a female president could be treated as a sufficient
token, relieving biased voters of further pressures to keep caring
about presidential gender disparities down the road.59
Indeed, even though the last election cycle has shown that a
woman can be a major party candidate as well as a presidential
56. See, e.g., Madeline E. Heilman, Description and Prescription: How Gender Stereo-
types Prevent Women’s Ascent Up the Organizational Ladder, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 657, 671
(2001) (stating “[i]f there is any ambiguity about [women’s] competence [in managerial po-
sitions], they are likely to be viewed as incompetent, and if their competence is unquestion-
able, they are apt to be socially rejected.”); Elizabeth J. Parks-Stamm et al., Motivated
to Penalize: Women’s Strategic Rejection of Successful Women, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 237, 245 (2008) (concluding “exposure to a woman who has achieved
success in a male-dominated work environment, an achievement generally viewed as
unattainable by women, can lead to costs in self-evaluation for her fellow women.”).
57. See, e.g., Anna C. Merritt et al., Moral Self-Licensing: When Being Good Frees Us
to Be Bad, 4 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 344, 354 (2010); Benoît Monin &
Dale T. Miller, Moral Credentials and the Expression of Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 33, 42 (2001).
58. In an analogous effect in the racial context, see, e.g., Daniel A. Effron et al., Endors-
ing Obama licenses favoring Whites, 45 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 590, 592 (2009).
59. Cf. Paul Usherwood, Elizabeth Thompson Butler: A Case of Tokenism, 11 WOMAN’S
ART J. 14, 14 (1990) (providing an example in the context of the art profession).
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frontrunner, few believe that this is conclusive evidence to the playing
field being leveled, and not merely because Hillary Clinton ended up
losing the election. Access to the resources necessary to successfully
run for president (financial, political, cultural, institutional, and emo-
tional), as well as the persistent prevalence of latent gender biases
in individual choice mechanisms,60 still favor men considerably and
disincentivize women from running.61 Whether the Clinton candi-
dacy should be measured by its glass-shattering beginning or its
poll-defying end is yet to be determined, but it seems fairly safe to
predict that if one holds the realities of the current political system
constant, most major party candidates, and therefore most presidents,
in the coming future are still likely to be men. Suffice it to note the
lingering disproportionate representation of men in the circles from
which serious presidential candidates still tend to emerge: Congress,
cabinet, governorships, military, business, academia, and media.62
Very well, says the critique, so we need to institutionalize the
election of women as presidents, and accept the price of arbitrary
exclusion that comes with it. This could be done in an egalitarian
way, for example, by alternating every four or eight years between
60. See, e.g., Tamar Kricheli-Katz & Tali Regev, How many cents on the dollar?
Women and men in product markets, 2 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 1 (2016), http://advances.sci
encemag.org/content/2/2/e1500599.full [http://perma.cc/5HUG-SMKZ] (documenting
gender disparity, disfavoring women, in the pricing of items sold on eBay).
61. See, e.g., JENNIFER L. LAWLESS & RICHARD L. FOX, IT STILL TAKES A CANDIDATE:
WHY WOMEN DON’T RUN FOR OFFICE 161 (2010).
62. “The 19.4 percent of seats (104 of 535) that women hold in the U.S. Congress
represents an all-time high. Progress is moving at a snail’s pace, however, and if it
continues at the current rate of change since 1960, women will not achieve equal
representation in Congress until 2117.” CYNTHIA HESS ET AL.,INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y
RES., THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE STATES: 2015—EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5 (2015), http://
statusofwomendata.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/SWS-Exec-Summary-f inal.pdf
[http://perma.cc/U7JZ-TKBY]. In 2015, women occupied 20 of the 100 seats on the U.S.
Senate, 84 of 435 seats on the House of Representatives, and six of the 50 state governor
positions. Id. at 3–5. Of President Trump’s 24 cabinet members, four are women. Kate
Samuelson, Women Make up Just 27% of the Trump Administration, FORTUNE (Mar. 10,
2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/10/trump-administration-jobs-women [http://perma
.cc/XM4A-8TXP]. Three of the 40 active duty four-star generals in the U.S. military are
women, List of active duty United States four-star off icers, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wiki
pedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_duty_United_States_four-star_officers#List_of_desig nated
_four-star_positions [http://perma.cc/8WTG-J9WE], and 32 companies on the Fortune 500
index employ women as CEOs, These Are the Women CEOs Leading Fortune 500 Com-
panies, FORTUNE (June 7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/06/07/fortune-500-women-ceos
[http://perma.cc/LHL4-FQ2A]. As of 2013, women held 37.5% oftenured positions in U.S.
universities. Women in Academia, CATALYST (Oct. 20, 2017), http://www.catalyst.org
/knowledge/women-academia#footnoteref28_o2tzs0s [http://perma.cc/6VJG-UBPH]. Finally,
as of 2014, “[g]ender inequality exists in print, on television, and online across all media
outlets and in all news topics.” WOMEN’S MEDIA CENTER, THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE
U.S. MEDIA 2014 16 (2014), http://wmc.3cdn.net/2e85f9517dc2bf164e_htm62xgan.pdf
[http://perma.cc/WBF8-R2DE].
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electing only men and only women for president. In such a system
women would have, with reasonable regularity, the ensured oppor-
tunity to run for and be elected president, without having to block
men out of the presidency altogether. Such an arrangement would
not do. Although it would significantly alleviate two of the major
harms of the norm of male-presidency—first by correcting an injus-
tice to women and second by letting the constituency regularly choose
among female candidates and be governed by female presidents—
such a reform would not tend to the problem of quality voting that
results from identity politics. Indeed, we are likely to see electoral
politics devolve into two separate cycles—one for women, the other
for men. Voters are likely to develop different attitudes to each kind
of cycle and to each kind of presidency, expecting different modes of
political expression and performance. Consider the analogy of sports,
where most competitions are separated by gender, often developing
competing ethics, rewards, and fan bases. In order for all voters to
be involved in, and committed to, the election of women as presi-
dents, this has to be the only game in town, so to speak. The prom-
ise that in four or eight years “my team” will be on display is not a
good way to get people engaged in the here-and-now.
2. Loss of Quality Male Candidates
The second external critique to the forty female presidents rule
echoes one of the model’s own justifications: the fact that the exclu-
sion of women from the presidency for so many generations has
robbed the American people of a large cadre of potentially quality
presidents—all the women that could have been good presidents but
could not realistically run for the office or get elected. The reform
explored here would similarly deprive us of all the quality male can-
didates who could potentially be better presidents than the women
that would invariably be elected. This is an undeniable social cost.
It attaches to any form of exclusion, and is exacerbated the larger
the excluded group happens to be—in our case, about half of the
population. At the same time, like with the former exclusion of women,
there is a mitigating aspect in the fact that the group that is allowed
to participate is extremely diverse, so we are still likely to get many
different kinds of presidents—in terms of party affiliation, ideology,
life experiences, and other identity markers (race, religion, sexual
orientation, age)—even if they are all women. Again, this is not a
solution to the problem of loss of quality candidates, but it makes
the cost more bearable, considering the size of the excluded group.
More importantly, only the exclusion of men for some genera-
tions will enable us to explore the unique features of the “female
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presidency”—to the extent that they exist—through the performance
of the variety of individuals that would hold the post. In other words,
to know whether and how gender matters in evaluating the quality
of a president, we have to engage in a real-life experiment in gender-
controlled elections. Since we cannot devise parallel universes in
which a man and a woman would face the same leadership chal-
lenges and then be evaluated according to their performance, a real-
life longitudinal study, so to speak, is the best we can hope for: we
have had almost two and a half centuries of male presidents, which
should allow us a pretty good picture of the variety of leadership
styles and qualities suggested by presidents who are (were) men; let
us now see the variety of female performance for a comparable
period, and continue from there. Of course, the two cohorts of presi-
dents would serve in very different eras and face very different chal-
lenges, but they would still be part of a relatively stable and coher-
ent constitutional system that still draws both institutionally and
ideologically from the same founding documents and the expressions
of value and sovereignty embedded in them.
B. Internal Critiques
I next consider critiques that are internal to the forty female
presidents rule. These critiques are based on an acceptance of the
basic moral premise of the model, namely that rules of arbitrary ex-
clusion could be justified in order to correct the kind of harms done
by previous exclusion. However, they question the persuasiveness
of the boundaries of the model, namely its focus on gender (when
exclusion from political participation has extended to many more
classes over the generations), and its focus on the presidency (when
exclusion from political participation has been the reality in many
other elected offices as well).
1. Why Women?
Put more accurately, the critiques ask “why only women?” or “why
women first?” Discrimination and exclusion from political participa-
tion have been the share of multiple classes and identity groups over
the generations, and it is not clear that women necessarily had the
worst of all in this sad competition. Why should they therefore be
the beneficiaries of the suggested reform, rather than other histori-
cally disenfranchised or chronically under-represented minorities
such as Native Americans, African Americans, Mexican Americans,
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Asian Americans, Jews, Muslims, or members of the LGBTQ com-
munity? What singles out women as the class that most justifies the
special treatment suggested by the forty female presidents rule?
Further, assuming we accept the suggested model, perhaps we should
expect it to replicate all of the other exclusionary aspects that charac-
terized the male-dominated system of previous generations. In other
words, perhaps we should expect to see mostly white women from
the country’s financial, social, and political elites running for and
serving as president, like we did with men in the past. If so, the
critique goes, then the suggested reform may resolve one significant
historical disparity in political participation, but it would not under-
mine the deeply seated social hierarchies that still define member-
ship, opportunity, and access for most Americans.
Both points are correct and the model cannot fully resolve the
challenges they invoke. Arguably, the optimal arrangement would
be based on a statistical representation algorithm that would ensure
full participation in the presidency to all classes and groups over the
years, based on their shares in the population and, perhaps, the
extent and severity of their past exclusions: for example, decreeing
that every fifth president would be an African American woman,
and so forth. The complexity—in both practical and moral terms—of
devising such a mechanism, however, is prohibitive. It would also
face the problem pointed to before of dedicating different election
cycles to different slices of the population.
Perhaps more to the point, the model suggested in this Article
indeed does not claim to tend to the full array of historical injustices
involved in political exclusion. It seeks to remedy the harms imposed
on the electorate as a whole by the exclusion of the consistently
biggest and most diverse group of all—women of all sorts and kinds.
Exhibiting the quality of intersectionality,63 women are also distin-
guishable by their historical subordination and exclusion from
leadership roles within both majority and minority communities, in
national and local politics alike. Forcing only women to run for and
be elected to the presidency would not ensure the representation of
minority women, but it would make it more likely than before. By
eliminating the participation of the class that benefitted most from
the exclusion of women in both majority and minority groups, new
space is created for minority women to exert agency and seek partic-
ipation, even under the still-stratified systems of race, ethnicity,
religion, and nationality that define class membership and mobility.
63. For a review, see Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 1771, 1777 (2005).
3
WILLIAM  & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW           [  V    o l. 24:235
2. Why Presidents?
What makes the presidency a position that uniquely fits the
suggested reform? Exclusion from political participation has been
part of all levels and functions of government for generations. In the
branches of the federal government, Congress suffers from under-
representation of women to this very day,64 and so does the Supreme
Court, with the three current female justices constituting an all-
time record.65 Why not create mandatory gender quotas for other
institutions as well? What is the reason to stop with the presidency,
or indeed to start with the presidency?
The answer is that, ironically, the presidency is not about repre-
sentation. A political position held at any time by a single individual,
the presidency, by definition, is incapable of providing all members
of the constituency the sense of presence, belonging, and shared
participation that is regularly used to legitimize the coercive power
of law in a democracy. Unlike the collegial institution of democratic
government—Congress—the presidency is not intended, and is struc-
turally unable, to reflect in its makeup, decision-making process,
modes of reasoning, or ultimate actions the diversity of membership
and ideology exhibited in the population that elected it. The legiti-
macy of presidential power derives from its function in promoting
the democratic values enshrined in the Constitution, not from popular
accountability (especially so in the second term) or representative-
ness. The Court similarly does not rely on popular acceptance, but
it is a collegial institution whose makeup and behavior is suscepti-
ble to evaluation and critique along identitarian lines; and it seems
to matter to many people whether there are on the Court women,
members of racial minorities, and the like.66
What this means is that imposing gender exclusions on the
access to such collegial institutions does real harm to the notion of
representative democracy; while no such harm takes place if the
presidency is limited to women alone. In the presidency, a man is no
less “represented” than a woman by a female president, since, by
64. See HESS ET AL., supra note 62, at 4.
65. See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: STILL A LONG
WAY TO GO 1 (2016), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/JudgesCourtsWomen
inFedJud7.14.16.pdf [http://perma.cc/JW54-V57G]. In the lower levels of the federal judi-
ciary, the numbers are similar: 35 percent of appeals judges are women, and 33 percent
of district judges are women. Id.
66. See, e.g., Barbara Luck Graham, Judicial recruitment and racial diversity on
state courts: an overview, 74 JUDICATURE 28, 29 (1990); Diane S. Sykes, Gender and
Judging, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1381, 1383 (2011) (raising qualms about the “prevailing view”
that involves identity politics in matters of judicial selection); Joy Milligan, Note, Plural-
ism in America: Why Judicial Diversity Improves Legal Decisions About Political Morality,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1206, 1229 (2006).
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definition, only one or the other could serve at any given time. If
only women were allowed to run for Congress, then men would have
a real claim of under-representation, since Congress can be made up
to represent both men and women; unitary positions like the presi-
dency cannot. Put more accurately, the only relevant sense in which
we can talk of “representation” in single-person institutions is dia-
chronic: along a temporal line of successive office-holders that, over
time, should come to reflect the full diversity of the constituency. As
we know, however, the promise of such diachronic representation in
the presidency has completely failed women (and other classes) over
the generations, hence invoking the corrective measure of the forty
female presidents model.
In this sense, the logic of the reform suggested here can extend
to other unitary elected positions from which women have been
systematically excluded—governors, mayors, and the like. Such exten-
sions of the argument, however, should be treated with care. Estab-
lishing a comprehensive “forty female executives” norm across the
board would entail the marginalization of men from a broad stretch of
political agency, and the accompanying social costs of such an exclu-
sion in terms of civic engagement and public commitment are likely
to outweigh the gender-equality-related benefits of the reform. Again
somewhat ironically, one of the attractive features of the forty female
presidents rule lies in its limited applicability to a single position
nationwide, a position that is extraordinarily difficult to attain or
even to plan or prepare for in any practical way: few people are likely
to change their life choices and behavior following its adoption. In
addition, unlike many other executive positions in the states, the pres-
ident in fact is not elected popularly, but rather through the mecha-
nism of the Electoral College, which presents another buffer between
the representation of popular will and the eventual selection.67
Given that access to the presidency is so exceptional, and be-
cause presidential selection and tenure bely assumptions of repre-
sentation anyhow,68 the offense to democratic expectations implied
67. See Akhil Reed Amar, Some Thoughts on the Electoral College: Past, Present, and
Future, 33 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 467, 472–73 (2007). Even Electoral College deadlocks are
resolved without recourse to popular majorities. See Sanford Levinson, Why It’s Smart
to Think About Constitutional Stupidities, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 359, 368–69 (2000) (criti-
cizing the Constitution’s mechanism for breaking presidential selection deadlocks in the
Electoral College, which confers the power on the House of Representatives acting on a
one-state-one-vote basis).
68. If an inefficient administration may endanger the very existence of a
democratic state, and if a lower degree of democratization guarantees a
more eff icient administration, the less democratic type of administrative
organization may be chosen in order to maintain the democracy of the
whole. This is certainly the reason why in all modern democracies the
method by which the chief executive is appointed is by far less democratic
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by the forty female presidents rule is relatively less pronounced
than possible parallel reforms in other branches or levels of govern-
ment. Sometimes, initiating reform at the top can be more readily
just than starting from below.
CONCLUSION
The forty female presidents rule is not likely to materialize in
the foreseeable future; less provocative constitutional reforms have
been failing the demanding obstacles of the Constitution’s amend-
ment process for decades.69 This does not mean it is not worth
considering seriously, as such an exercise can be valuable in helping
us recognize our institutional blind spots, as well as our normative
fixations. Imagining a truly radical reform, especially one that rests
on essentially unassailable moral grounds—here, the clear injustice
in the gendered formation of the presidency for centuries—is a
useful way to begin discussing real, or more feasible, reforms, but
this time with a much broader normative pool of institutional possi-
bilities from which to draw.
There seems to be little dispute that it is “about time” that the
United States elect a woman as president. Beyond the symbolic sense
of elation that such an election—if it ever comes—could and should
give us, it seems just as indisputable that the election of a single fe-
male president would mean very little to the institution of the presi-
dency, with its forty-five predecessors spanning nearly 230 years in
office. To know that we have in fact arrived at the “time” of the female
presidency, we must be aware of the full potential—institutional, ideo-
logical, political—that it holds, and this can only be known through
the experience of multiple, diverse female presidents. If one accepts
this premise, then institutional design has to be part of the discus-
sion, and hence our institutional imagination is called upon to pro-
vide material for thought. The forty female presidents rule presents
an overall just policy prescription, which is also a thought experi-
ment capable of provoking the mind, if not one’s moral convictions.
The Office of the President of the United States is undergoing
a fundamental recalibration in front of our very eyes, with orthodox-
ies of decision-making, discourse, and demeanor being discarded
with the flutter of a tweet. As the meaning and the mission of the
presidency is being negotiated, the possibility of greater transforma-
tions in the future must not be overlooked.
than the method by which the parliament is elected. The President of the
United States, elected indirectly by the people and not responsible to the
parliament, is a less democratic organ than the House of Representatives.
Hans Kelsen, Foundations of Democracy, 66 ETHICS 1, 76 (1955).
69. Levinson, supra note 67, at 371.
